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 In the islands of Zanzibar (Unguja and Pemba), the memories of violence and 
repression perpetrated by revolutionaries and the state from 1964 to 1975 have long been 
banished from the public space. The official narrative of the 1964 Revolution and the first 
phase of the post-revolutionary periodi developed and propagated by the Revolutionary 
Government of Zanzibar, through a control over the production, transmission, and circulation 
of ideas, combined with repressive measures against dissenting voices, led people to keep 
their memories private. The official injunction calling for silence did not bringabout a 
forgetting of the past, but rather contributed to the clandestine transmission and reconstruction 
of fragments of individual, familial, and community memories within private circles. These 
alternative memories, built upon the direct remembering of violence directed against a large 
portion of the population of Zanzibar between 1964 and 1975, have been reconfigured in 
relation to contemporary socio-political tensions and economic hardships. 
  
Unlike many places in the world in which the politics of memory has become commonplace, 
Zanzibar has not yet witnessed any upheavals of memories that haveradically and publicly 
contested the official version imposed by the state. However, as this article will show, several 
recent initiatives attest to the fact that a new era has begun, characterized by the publicization 
of collective memories that were formerly transmitted privately. These initiatives have been 
made possible by an expansion of the freedom of speech, the recognition of a political 
opposition, and the proliferation of places and modes of expression, notably the media, since 
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thedemocratization process of the mid-1990s. The memory narratives that are publicly 
expressed today, and conflated with the rewriting of the history of the Isles, show that there is 
no single and homogeneous memory of the past. On the contrary, there are multifaceted yet 
intertwined collective memories of the murky decade that relate to the position of individuals 
and communities in the past and in the present. Different claimsinterlace tojustifythe 
contemporary return of the past in the present, such as expressions of public repentance, call 
for moral reparations, demands for financial compensation, and attempts to disqualify the 
political elite in a context of intense collective dissatisfaction with the regime and the absence 
of a shift in power. Politically committed groups have taken the lead in encouraging and 
making use of the re-emergence of the traumatic past of the Isles as a critique of power in 
contemporary Zanzibar. 
  
This article asserts that instead of leading to a pacified memory and to social reconciliation, 
the remembering of the 1964 violence and the subsequent years of repression triggers 
memory disputes that are expressed along political and community lines. The political 
subjectivities that are being built through the presentification of this contested past have 
theparticularity of reappropriating, transposing, and symbolically reinvestingformer identity 
referents thatare rooted in the history of the Isles,but that are indefectibly the bearers 
ofpolarizing divisions, most notably between "Arabs" and "Africans." The past, with its 
confrontational racial divisions and its controversial heritage of slavery, lingers on behind the 
resurfacing and politicization of underground collective memories in contemporary Zanzibar. 
 
The Dark Years in Zanzibar (1964–1975) 
 
 In the middle of the night of January 11–12, 1964, about 300 armed men attacked the 
police headquarters of Ziwani and the police station of Mtoni in Zanzibar Town to seize 
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firearms.A second group of men was in charge of occupying Radio Zanzibar station with 
aview to cutting communicationbetween the islands and the rest of the world.ii This is how the 
insurrection (called acoup d‘etat by its opponents and a revolutionby its organizers and 
supporters) started. Within only a few hours, it overthrew the Sultanate of Zanzibar and its 
first independent government onlyone month after Zanzibar gained its independence from 
British rule on December 10, 1963. Sultan Seyyid Jamshed Abdulla managed to escape with 
his family. But all the members of the government were arrested, among them the Prime 
Minister, Mohammed Shamte, and hisMinister of Foreign Affairs, Ali Muhsin al-Barwani. On 
January 12, 1964, the Popular Republic of Zanzibar was established under the leadership of 
Abeid Amani Karume. In the course of the following weeks, firearms circulated and violence 
broke out as the leaders of this ―armed putsch‖ (Prunier 1998: 95) lost control of the situation. 
The overthrow of the government and the arrest of its members as well as of other political 
opponents marked the beginning of a period of bloody and brutal repression.iiiPeople of Arab 
origin and other groups considered foreign (Asians and Comorians) were targeted.
iv
 Shops 
were looted, houses burnt, women raped, and men beaten and humiliated, in Zanzibar Town, 
and even more so in the villages of the countryside in Unguja and Pemba (Okello 1967). 
Thousands of people lost their lives, fled or were forced into exile in the following months. 
Civil order was restored only after neighboringTanganyika sent in troops. 
  
On April 22, 1964, a hundred days after the overthrow of the first independent government of 
the Isles, the President of the Republic of Tanganyika, Julius Kambarage Nyerere, and the 
President of the Popular Republic of Zanzibar, Abeid Amani Karume, signeda treaty of 
Union, which established the United Republic of Tanzania. The islands kept their 
owngovernment, led by the Revolutionary Council. The Afro-Shirazi Party(ASP) was 
declared theonlylegal party. Most internecine violence ended, but the authoritarian regime led 
by President Karume and the ―Committee of 14‖v did not spare their opponents or the 
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uncooperative. Many former members of the first government of theIsles were jailed, killed,or 
condemned to exile. The small circle of Marxist ―comrades‖ (makomredi) of the Umma Party 
was sidelined.Yet even claiming allegiance to ASP did not guarantee one's safety. Karume 
greatly feared the founding members and stalwarts of the ASP, as well as educated 
administrative officers who had deep political convictions and who were able to articulate a 
soundly argued political critique, mobilize the population, and oppose his personal power. As 
Issa Shivji asserts, ―Karume had an intense hatred for and suspicion of the educated‖ (2008: 
112) who he perceived as his political rivals. Arbitrary power prevailed in a regime that tried 
to exercise its monopoly not only by repressing the Zanzibar intelligentsia but also by 
controlling potential civil contestation.vi In this ―terror regime of the highest order‖ (Bakari 
2001: 106), public freedoms were limited and associations banned, the press muzzled, and 
public gatherings forbidden except for parades and marches of the youth to fosternational 
mobilization, citizenship, and discipline (Burgess 2005c).The channels of circulation of 
narratives of the past, and their potential uses in the arena of political contestation, were 
definitely obstructed. Allegationsof a plot against Karume in 1969 wereused as an excuse to 
organize mass arrests andto detain and eliminate real, potential, or alleged opponents. Three 
years later, the assassination of Karume on April 7, 1972 sparked off a second wave of arrests 
of former members of the Umma Partywho organized or supported the plot. Among all the 
men imprisoned in the period from 1964 to 1975, many are still missing today. 
 
The politicization of identities in Zanzibar 
  
 Present-day memories of the period from the overthrow of the first independent 
government of Zanzibar in 1964 to the relative relaxing of the authoritarian regime's grip in 
the mid-1970s,which draw fromlivedexperience, are directly connected to the interpretation of 
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the bloody insurrection of the Revolution. If heated debates about the identity of the planners 
of the insurrection are commonplace,vii these questions are not central to an identification of 
the nature of the political imaginaries that constituted the ideological foundation of the 
Revolution, and these debates were re-conducted through the dark post-revolutionary years to 
the present day. As Garth Myers puts it, ―how the story [of the Revolution] is told has become 
as interesting and enlightening as a recounting of what actually happened‖ (2000: 430). 
  
The intricate history of identity construction in Zanzibar and of the politicization of ethnic and 
racial identities during the period of intense political competition that preceded independence 
between 1957 and 1963 is well known (Sheriff 1987; Sheriff and Ferguson 1991; Burgess 
2005a, 2005b; Glassman 2004, 2011), and will be sketched out here only briefly. On the eve 
of the Revolution, the cosmopolitan Zanzibari culture—built upon cultural markers referring 
to Islam, the Arab culture of the Arabian Peninsula, the Swahili language, and the well-
delimitated island territory (Middleton and Campbell 1965; Fair 2001)—started to split along 
ethnic and racial lines. Two competing conceptions of national identity, citizenship, and 
sovereignty, built upon a polarizing racial paradigm, were promoted by intellectuals and 
propagandists whose words were propagated in newspapers. These propagandists were at the 
head of the most virulent community associations, which laterbecame political 
parties,(Glassman 2000, 2011). The Arab elite developed a local nationalism rooted in the 
cosmopolitan and Muslim culture of Zanzibar, but were reluctant to recognize the citizenship 
and political rights of Africans from the Mainland. As for the political activists proclaiming 
themselves as ―Africans,‖ they promoted a black African nationalism espousing and 
propagating the idea that the islands had been invaded by alien Arabs and should revert to 
their true indigenous owners, black Africans. 
  
 6 
 
After 1964, the argument was put forward by the new regime in power that the armed 
uprising of January had precipitated the overthrow of the tyrannical power of an alien Arab 
minority, represented by the Omani sultanate and the landed aristocracy, by an African 
majority of genuine autochthones whohad been deprived of their natural right to sovereignty 
for centuries. The uprising was seen as the first ―African revolution‖ ofeastern Africa. This 
reading of the event has underpinned the nationalist meta-narrative of the former single 
party[meaning not clear. Do you mean that there was only one single party allowed to 
function in the country? Or do you mean that there was one party in the beginning and that it 
divided into two or more parties?] and the revolutionary government since 1964. A strong 
control of the public space and of the places of intellectual production contributed to the 
propagation of this nationalist imaginary of liberation as a form ofrevenge. In the 
controversial book, Zanzibar: The 1964 Revolutionby OmarMapuri, a high-ranking 
politician in the government, the Revolution is described as ―the logical outcome of centuries 
of oppression and subjugation of the African people‖ (1996: 1).State-mandated or sanctioned 
history and literature also contributed to the dissemination of this version of the past. Garth 
Myers (2000) shows the extent to which Swahili novels used in high school curricula depict 
socioeconomic inequalities based ona radical division between Arabs and Africans. These 
―dominant scripts‖ of the Revolution are the tools of state propaganda.  
  
Today, the government of Zanzibar still calls itself ―revolutionary.‖ The children of the 
leaders of the 1964–1975 period are amongst the major political figures in power today. 
Every January 12, the state organizes themise–en–scèneof the past in commemoration of the 
Revolution and in celebration of the father of the nation, Abeid Amani Karume. It thus creates 
and diffuses images of its power with a view to silencing alternative representations.However, 
alternative national imaginaries of a Muslim and cosmopolitan Zanzibar continued to 
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circulate within close social circles (families, friends, groups in exile) that the state could not 
control easily. Moreover, besides the official historiography of the state, a renewed reading of 
the Revolution is elaborated and defended by highly respected Tanzanian academics (Sheriff 
2008; Shivji 2008). The presence and diffusion of these ―oppositional scripts‖ (Myers 2000), 
which have a variable public visibility, show that there is no univocal version of history in 
today‘s memory landscape. The conceptions of identity, citizenship, and sovereignty that are 
linked to the nationalist narratives upon which representations of Zanzibari society were built 
still polarize the population forty-five years after the Revolution. 
 
Fragments of survivors’ narratives 
 
 The victims and the authors of the crimes committed during the Revolution and the 
years that followed are today in their sixties, or older.
viii
 Many of them speak of their 
memories with those within their own social circles only. Memories of the dark years, during 
which any recollections of the traumas suffered were suppressed and when denunciations 
were commonplace, frequently leading to arrest and interrogation, instilled a self-reflex of 
caution and self-preservation.ix Salum*,x an informant who was more than seventy years old at 
the time of the interview, stated that, even today, he kept nothing at home that could possibly 
compromise him in the eyes of the ruling regime.He has systematically eliminatedall traces of 
the past and alsoremoved contemporary objects that could betray his activities or his political 
beliefs. 
  
From the perspective of those targeted by the revolutionaries, that is, Arab families 
considered foreign, the revolutionary days of mid-January 1964 in Zanzibar Town speak of 
fear, violence, and death. Othman*, a man of Arab origin approaching the age of seventy, tells 
how he fled from his home, on the evening of January 11, accompanied by his young children 
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but leaving behind his terrified wife. They sought refuge with his parents, close to Stone 
Town, in the neighborhood of Shangani. Othman* recalls the corpse-strewn streets and the 
mutilated he met on the way. The little family remained hidden the entire week of the 
curfew,stomachs knotted with fear and eating little. When he finally returned home, he 
learned that his wife had been killed. In his own words, the images will remain forever 
engraved in his memory.  
 
Salma*, a woman in her fifties whose Omani grandfather and Iranian grandmother had settled 
in Zanzibar during the sultanate, tells how her family, warned of the impending danger by her 
father‘s Swahili mistress, sought refuge in the house of close friends. She remembers seeing, 
through the window, people being massacred and pregnant women being disembowelled.  
 
Most biographical narratives collected during fieldwork repeat the same themes: people fled, 
hid, were terrified. If the memories of the revolutionary daysevoke narratives of personal 
experiences, often considered by the informants as a collection of images engraved upon the 
individual memory, the remembering of the years that followed the Revolution depicts a 
general atmosphere of repression, when each individual remained alert to the possibility of 
reprisals. Othman* remembers well how the arbitrariness of violencewas part of one's daily 
life: ―If someone hates you, he just picks up a gun, that‘s it!‖ An atmosphere of generalized 
mistrust pervaded daily life, seriouslyundermining peaceful socio-racial relations. 
  
Among former prisoners, the traumas of detention and torture have left their scars. Ngwali 
Usi, an escapee imprisoned in 1972 for ten years for having assisted another prisoner 
inescaping,described the terrible conditions during detention: ―People came out in very bad 
shape. We were like animals. When a meal arrived, you ate like an animal.‖ According to 
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Hussein*, who had been imprisoned from 1972 to 1978 between the ages of 23 and 29, the 
watchword was: ―Little food, a lot of salt, no medicine.‖ The poor treatment and the torture 
finished off prisoners weakened by a lack of food and suffering from health problems induced 
by an over-consumption of salt. Some prisoners were tortured until they lost consciousness. 
Prisoners considered to be enemies of the state were treated with a particular cruelty. 
Hussein* tells how a former member of the Umma Party who survived his ordeals, was 
imprisoned after the assassination of Karume in 1972, and was chained hand and foot, day 
and night. He was repeatedly tortured. Hussein* recounts with admiration how the man never 
cried out or asked for mercy: ―He never said, ‗Mother, my God, mercy!‘ Not once.‖ And 
while Hussein* also recounted a scatological anecdote as proof that the prisoners nevertheless 
maintained a certain sense of humor during their ordeals,xi the general impression 
communicated is that the years of detention were years of physical and moral suffering. The 
self-imposed exile endured by many prisoners freed undera presidential pardon in 1978 was 
perceived as a double trauma. Some left their families behind in Zanzibar, seeing them only 
during clandestine visits to the islands. Those claiming to be innocent of the crime with which 
they were charged are filled with bitterness. As Ngwali Usi testifies, his political involvement 
never bore the hopedfor fruits: ―Why did they arrest me? I was so devoted! I regret this time 
because I didn‘t receive the rewards I had hoped for.‖ 
  
These fragmentary narratives of lived experiences bear witness to the fact that these memories 
are vivid and painful even today because the actors and witnesses of the Revolution and the 
authoritarian post-revolutionary years are still alive. The temporal proximity of these lived 
events and the traumatic nature of the violence suffered give rise to memories that are 
clandestine, individual, familial or collective, but that are nevertheless generally restricted to 
fellow victims when it comes to sharing them; these memories are not publicly declaimed. It 
is well known that rejection is a normal phase in the evolution of traumatic memories 
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(Ricoeur 2000). Victims tend to internalize their memories of traumatic events and thus block 
the possible pathways of their transmission. In this respect, the statements presented here 
agree with the claim that if memories of past events are narrated or shared between and 
among individuals of the same generation, they are rarely related to the children of the 
survivors. As for the oppressors, they are ageing peacefully, untroubled by any calls for 
repentance. However, in the case discussed here, this phase of rejection that is common to 
memories of violence worldwide must be understood in the specific context of an official 
injunction to silence by the Zanzibari state. The wall of silence erected against the production 
of either individual or collective narratives explains that, with few exceptions, it is not so 
much the survivors of the dark years who are the new producers of memories, but rather their 
children, who are today in their forties. The emergence from a phase of amnesia relating to 
the Revolution and the Karume years is the result of attempts by those who consider 
themselves the heirs of the victims of the repressive past of the Isles. Despite the fears and the 
silences, some fragments of a ―truncated‖ (Rossi 2009) or ―confused‖ memory (Deslaurier 
and Roger 2006: 9) have circulated from one generation to another and, in the contemporary 
context of greater freedom of political expression, have called up the traumatic past of the 
islands. 
 
Aboud Nadhif Abdallah, arrested and disappeared since 1969 
 
 The weekly Dira, in its issue of July 18–24, 2003, published an article on the 
demands for compensationmade by Ibrahim Aboud Nadhif regarding the disappearance of his 
father, Aboud Nadhif Abdallah, in 1969. The latter, who was arrested by the security forces 
that year, is stillmissing as neither his body nor the death certificate has been returned to the 
family. The article reprinted the letter, sent on January 14, 1982 by Aboud‘s younger brother 
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to the then prosecuting attorney Augustino Ramadhani, requesting that the death of Aboud 
Nadhif Abdallah be officially recognized. The letter mentions two prior written requests to the 
Ministry of Home Affairs made by the family, one in February 1975, requesting that he be 
pardoned, the other in August 1981, requesting information on Aboud‘s whereabouts; neither 
received a reply. The response to the letter of 1982, received a year later on January 17, 1983, 
officially recognized the death and requested that the relevant authorities issue a 
deathcertificate to the family of the deceased. However, the certificate was never issued and 
Ibrahim Aboud Nadhif now intends to take legal action with aview toreceiving financial 
compensation.  
  
The Dira article presents Aboud Nadhif Abdallah‘s short biography and the story of his 
arrest. Aboud, originally from Makunduchi in the southeast of the island of Unguja, was 
Principal Secretary in the Ministry of Trade and Industry from 1964 to 1969. He was initially 
trained as a teacher at Beit el Ras, the only teacher-training college in Zanzibar at that time, 
and thereafter pursued his studies in Canada, Great Britain, the United States, and Yugoslavia. 
In January 1969, after serving five years in the Ministry, he was told to resign without any 
explanation. In March 1969, he received instructions to return to his post but he refused to 
comply until such time as he received an explanation for his dismissal. He was arrested at his 
propertyofCheju, in the countryside, on April 30, 1969, and imprisoned without trial, leaving 
behind a wife and nine children.  
 
When we met, his widow provided further details of his arrest. On April 30, 1969, she was in 
the fields with her husband. The children had been left in the care of their grandmother in 
Makunduchi, except the last-born who was still being breastfed. Aboud, needing some 
supplies, left his wife to go and get them in the neighboring village where he discovered that 
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Hassan Mandera himself, the head of state securitywas waiting for him. The latter asked 
Aboud to follow him, saying the order came directly from Karume. Mandera and Aboud 
knew each other, being neighbors in the quarter of Jang‘ombe in Zanzibar Town where 
Aboud had his house. Mandera allowed Aboud to go and inform his wife. Aboud was aware 
that it was useless to attempt to flee or hide, so hecooperated and left in a car with Mandera. 
He was never seen again, and his family never had any further news of him. On 
severaloccasions, his wife went to the ASP headquarters in Kisiwandui to meet Karume onthe 
days he received ordinary citizensto ask for mercy, but she was never received.Since the 
arrest, she claims not to have received her husband‘s pension and her children‘s rights to 
inheritance have not been recognized. She declares that Karume‘s assassination in 1972 was, 
for her, a sort of justice. She said she cried the day she read the article about her husband in 
Dira in 2003. When I asked if she talked about her missing husband, she replied without 
hesitation that she often spoke of him to her children and grandchildren. Her grandchildren‘s 
curiosity about the past was, according to her, the reason for the recounting of these family 
stories because, she told me, they unceasingly ask her why they have a grandmother but no 
grandfather. 
  
On August 22, 2003, onlyone month after the publication of the article about Aboud Nadhif 
Abdallah in Dira, Ibrahim Aboud Nadhif sent a letter to the Attorney General of Zanzibar 
requesting information on the fate of his father. The reply, dated August 26, 2003, was 
definitive: ―We are sorry to inform you that the Attorney General‘s office does not (i) deal 
with matters related to the security of the nation (ii) keep records of the disappeared.‖ 
Although he was not surprised by this response, Ibrahim Aboud Nadhif was full of bitterness. 
As he underlined, his requeststo the government were motivated by three reasons. Firstly, he 
explained, all Muslims wish to bury their dead and pay their respects. Secondly, he added that 
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he wished Zanzibaris to remember all the evil of the revolutionary years. Finally, it is obvious 
that the question of inheritance is a thorn in the side of the family, who, while not excessively 
poor, nevertheless wish to claim what is rightfully theirs. 
 
Repentance and reparations 
 
 The detailed presentation of the story of Aboud Nadhif Abdallah and his family is 
important as it permits us to understand the various rationales that underlie the introduction 
into the public space of a family memory perpetuated by the principal witness to the event, in 
this case Aboud‘s wife.While he is strongly supported in his endeavors by his family, Ibrahim 
Aboud Nadhif is the main actor of this displacement of memory. On numerous occasions 
during the interview, he insisted that he dared to speak out, for he does not fear the state 
authorities. The imagined or real reprisals that the majority of the population has feared for 
years cannot silence him. To understand Ibrahim‘s determination, it must be pointed out that 
Aboud‘s family is known and respected among the old Zanzibari families of the city. Ibrahim, 
an active member of the opposition party, Civic United Front,ever since the introduction of 
political pluralism in 1992, twice stood for elections in 1995 and 2000. He has clearly taken a 
stand in opposition against the party in power. Furthermore, Ibrahimwas wellacquainted with 
Ali Nabwa, the late Chief Editor of Dira, and part of the team of journalists who had set up 
the newspaper at the end of 2002. Subsequently, he became an avid reader of Dira because of 
the issues it addressed, the political stances taken by the journalists, and the freedom of 
expression that the newspaper represented. When the newspaper began to publish articles that 
revisited the history of the Isles before and shortly after the Revolution, Ibrahim decided to 
ask Dira to publicize the story of his father and his family. 
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It is noteworthy that Ibrahim drew upon international precedents of this sort to justify his 
claims. He thus evokes, in the Diraarticle, the financial compensation paid to Jews in respect 
of the Nazis' crimes fifty years earlier, and the demands lodged by the actors, and 
theirdescendants, of the Mau-Mau uprising against the British colonial power in Kenya. He 
also refers to the claims of black Africans of South Africa for compensation or reparation for 
the injustice they suffered under apartheid and the apology offered by Japan to Korea for the 
atrocities committed during the period of Japanese occupation in the first half of the twentieth 
century. As such, in Zanzibar, the significance of the memories that emerged and that were 
maintained in, and transmitted through, close social networks can only be understood in the 
global context of the politics of memory and the claims for moral reparations. The various 
forms of private memory are made to flow consciously and deliberately into the globalized 
mold of demands for compensation and repentance in order to gain legitimacy. If the 
historical contexts of the examples mentioned by Aboud Nadhif to support his request are 
substantially different from the historical context of the case under consideration here, they 
nevertheless have in common the fact that ―the present is seized as the moment to redress the 
injustices of the past‖ (Jewsiewicki 2004: 7). In other words, the requested compensationis 
aimedat reinstating the descendents of the disappeared or the murdered in the social and 
economic positions that they would not have lost had they not suffered prejudice. 
  
However, such prosaic claims for financial compensation are, for Ibrahim, marked by a more 
general ethical perspective, onethat goes beyond the scope of personal material compensation. 
Indeed, Ibrahim recalls that the ordeals suffered by his family constitute just one case among 
many. He insists that the publicization of his own case should be a way of reviving a 
collective memory that the elders tended to bury or that was transmitted only partially to the 
younger generations. Through the mediatization of the painful memories of his family, 
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Ibrahim, therefore, intends to act as the spokesperson of all Zanzibari families affected by the 
revolutionary and post-revolutionary violence in a country where there has yet to be a 
collective mobilization of memories. Ibrahim also insists that the state should publicly 
acknowledge its wrongs. It is, nevertheless, important to underline that Ibrahim‘s demand for 
public repentance does not seem to entail a demand for reconciliation at the national 
level.Ibrahim's assertion that it is essential to preserve the memories of the atrocities 
committed in the past rests upon prospects of vengeance.As we shall see now, demands for 
public recognition and repentance are non-dissociable from the deep tensions of the political 
life of the Isles, themselves inscribed in the conflicting representations of identity and of the 
nation that have beset Zanzibari society for decades. 
 
Thevictims of the Karume years 
 
 In thearticleinDira, a simple sentence reveals a major political gamble underlying the 
demands for repentance and reparations that Ibrahim has voiced: ―If Aboud Nadhif‘s family 
succeeded in claiming their rights, this would open the door to numerous similar claims.‖ In 
other words, if the government were to recognize the legitimacy of the demands made by 
Aboud‘s family, every family in Zanzibar who had suffered similarly might wish to bring 
forward their own cases. Beyond theswamping of the judicial system that such an initiative 
might imply, these claims would also disclose to the public sphere the truths of the past that 
successive Zanzibari governments have attempted to conceal or deny. In order to understand 
how such a move could destabilize the state, it is important to look at the identities and 
activities of other individuals who disappeared in the aftermath of the Revolution. In this 
respect, the names listed at the end of the Dira article are revealing: Muhammed Salum 
Barwani (alias Salum Jinja), Muhammed Humoud Barwani, Hamza Muhammed, Abdallah 
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Kassim Hanga, Mdungi Usi, Abdulaziz A.K. Twala, Idrissa Abdalla Majura, or Othman 
Shariff. All, including Aboud Nadhif Abdallah, were members of the intellectual elite who 
had been educated in the island‘s best schools (Dole, Euan Smith Madrassa, Saida Matuka, 
Saint Joseph, Beit el Ras). Most of them had pursued their studies abroad, some at Makerere 
University in Uganda, others in Great Britain,or in the communist countries in Europe,or 
inEgypt or Cuba, having benefited from the scholarships programme between Zanzibar and 
Marxist countries (Burgess 2005a).Upon their return to Zanzibar, they were granted posts in 
the government or in the public administration, holding positions of responsibility. All those 
who were judged dangerous by Karume and his clique because they had criticized a failed 
revolution that had changed into an authoritarian state, and who could have attempted to 
overthrow the men in power, were eliminated. Among them, the names of Abdallah Kassim 
Hanga, Othman Shariff, and Abdulaziz Twala stand out. Abdallah Kassim Hanga, who was 
educated in the UK and then in Moscow, became the Deputy General Secretary of the ASP 
and was appointed Vice-President of the Popular Republic of Zanzibar. Othman Shariff, an 
agricultural engineer by training who was a long-standing ASP member, became Minister of 
Education and Culture. Abdulaziz Twala, a member of the Revolutionary Council, was at the 
head of the Ministry of Finance. Karume managed to sideline these men by repeatedly 
shuffling them from one post to another within the Zanzibari government or by sending them 
to work for the Union government (Kassim Hanga held a number of different Union 
ministerial positions), or abroad (Othman Shariff served as Ambassador of Tanzania to 
Washington). 
  
The first three names mentioned in the list printed in Dira are those of middle-ranking 
politicians arrested and put in jail in the months following the Revolution, and who therefore 
did not participate in Karume‘s government. According to some of their surviving cellmates, 
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these three men were killed and buried in a mass grave in the northern part of Unguja, today a 
military camp closed to civilians. The other missing individuals on the list were arrested and 
imprisoned in 1969 following accusations of plotting against Karume. The two alleged 
ringleadersxii of the plot, Kassim Hanga and Othman Shariff, who had finally left for exile a 
few years after the Revolution and sought refuge, the former in Guinea and the latter in the 
Iringa region in mainland Tanzania, were arrested, returned to Zanzibar, and executed:―There 
are gruesome stories of how Hanga was killed, some say by drowning, other by beheading. 
Whatever the truth, there can be little doubt of Karume‘s tactics of physically eliminating his 
opponents while terrorising potential ones‖ (Shivji 2008: 113). Mdungi Usi, a founder and 
leader of the ASP, was arrested at home one evening in 1969. He was a former teacher and 
head of Zanzibar‘s national radio station before being posted as a regional officer, and, 
finally, was employed at the municipality of Zanzibar, all in the space of three years. One of 
his sons recalls having twice visited him in prison before the family lost all contact with him. 
Mdungi Usi‘s brother, Ngwali Usi, was arrested the same year. Although, in his words, he 
was less involved in politics than his brother, Ngwali thinks that he was accused of having 
helped Idrissa Abdalla Majura (the seventh name on Dira‘s list) to flee, driving himto 
Kizimbazi in the south of the island, where he took a dhow to the Mainland. He ended up in 
prison along with his brother, Mdungi, and Aboud Abdalla Nadhif. One night, the three men 
and several other prisoners were removed from their cells by the guards. According to the 
rumors then circulating among the prisoners, they were all accused of having plotted against 
Karume after a cache of arms was discovered on Tumbatu Island. Ngwali Usi never saw his 
brother, Mdungi, or Aboud Abdalla Nadhif again. As for Idrissa Abdalla Majura, who had 
fled to the Mainland, he was eventually arrested and returned to Zanzibar to serve his 
sentence. He was imprisoned along with the former Minister of Finance, Abdulaziz Twala, 
who was said to have fallen from grace for having tried to limit the private use of public 
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funds.xiii According to Ngwali Usi, the two men finally escaped from prison but were 
denounced by a friend whose help they had requested in their attempt to organize their secret 
departure. According to others, Majura and Twala were killed in 1971 in the notorious Ba 
Mkwe prison, where interrogations were carried out under torture. 
  
The final wave of arrests and imprisonments is linked to Karume's assassination on April 7, 
1972 at the ASP headquarters. The plot was planned and executed by former members of the 
Umma Party.xiv Karume was shot dead by Lieutenant Hamoud, an army officer and a member 
of the Umma Party, who was also Ali Muhsin‘s nephew, and whose father had been killed in 
detention. All the former leaders of the Umma Party were arrested: Ali Sultan Issa, 
Abdulrahman Babu, Ahmed Badawi Quallatein, Khamis Abdulla Ameir, and Ali 
Mahfoudh(Chase 1976: 19–20). Even those who had been close to Karume, such as Ali 
Mahfoudh, were arrested (Shivji 2008: 105, 122). Sympathizers of the cause of the 
makomredi, such as Ali Nabwa, the late chief editor of Dira, and all those accused of being 
involved in Karume‘s assassination in one way or another were imprisoned. Although many 
suspects were released a few months later, those who remained in prison were accused of 
conspiracy and high treason during a show trial that lasted more than a year. They were 
sentenced to death or to various prison terms.Whether in 1964, 1969 or 1972, only leaders of 
international renown, such as Mohamed Shamte, Ali Muhsin, and Abdulrahman Babu, were 
not executed, although they were not spared prison and torture. Mohamed Shamte and Ali 
Muhsin spent ten years in prison. Abdulrahman Babu and Ali Mahfoudh, both initially 
sentenced to death, spent five years in prison before being forced into exile(Chase 1976: 30). 
The others were eliminated or remain mysteriously ―missing.‖xv 
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Politicians were not the only victims of the repressive excesses of the Karume years, but 
ordinary people in the thousands were also affected.During the turbulent days of January 
1964, and in the following weeks, arms circulated freely. Witnessesclaim that many took 
advantage of the turmoil to settle old scores with neighbors or employers. Far from being 
based on a systematic and organized selection of those whom the revolutionaries considered 
to be foreigners (Arabs, Asians, and Comorians),the Revolutiondegenerated into 
uncontrollable forms of violence whose victims were of diverse origins and of all political 
persuasions. Rare is the family that claims no victims among itsmembers, whether they were 
close relatives or members of the extended family.During the subsequent years, the 
nationalization of private property and the redistribution of land impoverished a large number 
of families, who saw only injustice. Consequently, membership of the category of ―victim‖ of 
the Revolution and of the Karume regime is not restricted to political prisoners alone, but 
extends to a much wider group of people (al-Barwani et al. 2003). Zanzibari society itself 
could demand justice in the form of official apologies or material compensation. It is, 
therefore, hardly surprising to hear Ali Haji Pandu, the former Chief Magistrate of Zanzibar, 
who is remembered for havingpresidedthe treason trial that followed Karume‘s assassination, 
say in our interview that the demands for compensation brought before the courts by the 
descendants of the disappeared ofthe Karume regime have, for the moment at least, little 
chance of success because a contemporary revival of the past in the present would stir the 
muddied waters of the post-revolutionary years. 
  
The responses to the claims made for justice highlight the fact that the political victims of the 
Revolution and the Karume years are all members of a closely knit social network. Victims 
and oppressors, the survivors and the dead,both belong to the same social milieu. Their 
destinies do not simply intersect in the specific encounter between victim and oppressor, 
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whether it be episodic (arrest and torture) or ongoing (years of detention), but, on the 
contrary, have always been linked. At the moment of the Revolution, the population of 
Zanzibar Town was scarcely 50,000, composed of a number of extended families that 
maintained close social relations through networks of patronage and marriage. Professional 
activities and religious orientation overlaid these networks to delimit enclaves of mutual 
familiarity. The majority of testimonies underline how the Revolution divided and finally split 
these people who, as children and young adults, had played together in the different quarters 
of the town, studied in the same schools, and worked in the same spaces. Ngwali Usi recalls 
that Abeid Amani Karume and Mdungi Usi were neighbors who had grown up together in the 
Mwembetanga quarter. Salum* tells us that he went to school with Abdulaziz Twala. Most 
members of the Umma Party, such as Ali Sultan Issa and Ali Nabwa, met when they were 
involved in the Youth Own Unionthat gathered the politically engagedMarxistvanguard 
youthswho saw themselves as a quite distinct historical group (Burgess 2005a, 2005b).If the 
silence about the events of the past has taken precedence over vocal accusations and calls for 
vengeance, it is as much a product of these close-knit networks of sociability linking 
individuals, families, and communities that constituted a socializing space occupied by the 
generation that lived through the Revolution and the Karume years. 
 
Memories, political competition, and the media 
  
 The publicization of memories of the recent past is non-dissociable from the socio-
political configuration that has taken place in Zanzibar since the early 1990s. The new 
context, characterized by the adoption of multi-partyism and increased efforts to democratize 
public debate, paved the way for a growing public dissemination of alternative representations 
of the past by the leaders of the new political parties.As a result of the reluctance of the 
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authorities in Zanzibar to adopt political pluralism, and of the strategies that they deployed to 
impede any change in power (Cameron 2002), the political disputes between the ruling party, 
Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM),and the principal opposition party, the Civic United Front 
(CUF), provoked impassioned debates on the concepts of identity and citizenship, which 
were inevitably dependent upon previous nationalist imaginaries(Bakari 2001; Crozon 1991; 
Rawlence 2005). Ethnicity and race were the key points of reference. For the CCM, the binary 
pair of ―African‖ and ―Arab‖ that had structured the official racist discourse since the pre-
independence period is repeatedly reactivated as a condition of access to power. Slavery, 
which constitutes a trope of the submission of the black African population on which the Arab 
edifice of the sultanate was founded, is in the firing line of these polarizing discourses. For 
the CUFthe principal boundaries of belonging lie between Zanzibaris (Wazanzibari), without 
ethnic or racial distinction, and mainlanders, pejoratively called Tanganyikans 
(Watanganyika) or Wazanzibara, a play on the word bara, meaning ―mainland.‖ The 
imaginaries of Zanzibari identity adopted by this party appeal to the island‘s age-old culture, 
but aresomewhat closed to the incorporation of new populations into the nation. The 
confrontation between these different conceptions of legitimate sovereignty is based 
ondifferent interpretations of the socioeconomic and political organization of the sultanate, 
the overthrow of the first government of the islands in January 1964, and the violence of the 
Revolution and the Karume years. It also draws upon the motives for the Union between 
Zanzibar and Tanganyika and its impact, considered negative, upon the economic and social 
development of the islands (Peter and Othman2006; Shivji 1990, 2008). In these disputes over 
representations of the islands‘ past engaged in by the leading political actors, history and 
memory are resources to be exploited in the struggle for power. 
  
Heirs to a confused memorymarked bysilences and by the unspoken, butinterspersed with the 
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voices from the past and the experiences of their elders, the post-revolutionary generation in 
Zanzibar is not content with the official version of history that underpins state nationalism. 
The more educated of the descendants of the victims of the Revolution, today in their forties 
or fifties,attempt to tease out the true from the false in order to take an effective stance in 
public debates. This search for knowledge draws from critical historical works that reject state 
orthodoxy. Hence, the most recent publication from Professor Emeritus in Law, Issa Shivji, 
Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? (2008), is cited in almost all conversations as an essential 
reference. Its publication was the occasion for a public launch in Zanzibar, at which the 
educated elite were present en masse. The critical literature, which proposes an alternative 
version to the official historiography, speaks to a widespread desire to know who the actors 
were and what the consequences of the Revolution and the subsequent years were. Copies of a 
volume by historian Thomas Burgess (2009), containing the biographies of the former 
revolutionary Ali Sultan Issa and the current First Vice-President of Zanzibar, Seif Sharif 
Hamad, were circulated and read widely. This book, which revisits the episodes of post-
revolutionary violence through the life stories of these two men, was publicly launched in 
Stone Town in early July 2009 in the presence of the author. This was the occasion for the 
audience to discuss once again the significance of the events of the past and to identify 
thedivisions that characterized contemporary Zanzibari society. The recent book byHarith 
Ghassany (2010), Kwaheri Ukoloni Kwaheri Uhuru! (Goodbye Freedom, Goodbye 
Colonialism!), has become a book of reference within nationalist circles.It is based on the 
personal testimonies of witnesses and actors of the Revolution, and is intended to reveal 
hidden facets of the event in order to assert the illegitimacy of the uprising, considered an 
illegitimate invasion of Mainland foreigners and the beginning of the colonization of the Isles 
by the Union state.Non-academic historical works (Kharusi 1967, 1969; Shahbal 2002), 
biographical narratives (Muhsin 1997; al-Barwani et al. 2003; Fairoz 1995),and politically 
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committed texts are also regularly citedin order to penetrate the significance of the multitude 
of historically obscure facts.Such texts, whether produced by amateurs or professionals,all 
contribute to the reinforcement of a historical and political consciousness. 
  
However, among the generation born after the revolution, it is visibly the opposition, whether 
its members are tacit supporters or politically active, who are not simply interested in the 
pasts of their elders, but who also seek actively to resurrect and publicize a memory hitherto 
marginalized. In this respect, it is essential to appreciate the role played by the journalists of 
the weekly Dira, and to simultaneously understand the processes of reappropriation of this 
newspaper by the educated as well as by the less educatedsectionsof the islands(Fouéré, 
forthcoming). Dira was edited by a small group of intellectuals, who were educated for the 
most part abroad, and who had already cut their teeth in journalism as well as, for some, in 
politics. The driving force of this newspaper was the Chief Editor, Ali Nabwa, a veteran of 
the Karume years and an outspoken supporter of the Umma Party. As he explained in his 
unpublished biography (Nabwa 2003), Ali Nabwa was a professional journalist of the official 
state newspaper in the 1970s and became the speechwriter for Omar Ali Juma, Chief Minister 
and later Vice-President of Zanzibar, at the end of the 1990s, after a brief sojourn in the 
Comoros, from where his family originated, and where he appears to have been implicated in 
a plot. All of Dira‘s journalists were free-speaking personalities, proclaiming loudly their 
Zanzibari nationalism. The weekly specialized in the publication of historical narratives 
dealing with the Revolution and the post-revolutionary years, revealing incidents that had 
hitherto remained absent from the public gaze. The journalists did not hesitate to criticize the 
government, also revealing recent corruption scandals among the political classes, lambasting 
the decline of public services and protesting against the seizure of property, private or public, 
by politicians. The articles that dealt with questions of Zanzibari identity clearly appealed to 
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the nationalist cultural imaginaries of a cosmopolitanand formerly sovereign nation. 
  
This political imaginary is precisely that to which the opposition party, CUF, has long 
appealed in its effort to mobilize the population. This explains not only the popularity of Dira 
but also its portrayal as an instrument of the opposition. Although all former journalists 
underlined that the newspaper was not aligned with any specific political party, insisting 
thatthey only aimed to speak the truth, the government saw it as an instrument created to 
discredit politicians and to destabilize society. The publicization of memories long suppressed 
and the effort to rewrite national history ran against the official national narrative 
underpinning the legitimacy of the CCM and the state. Different ministers wrote to Dira 
requesting explanations for the storiespublished in its pages. It was barely a year before the 
paper was banned, in December 2003; the approaching 2005 electionwas undoubtedly one of 
the reasons behind this decision. For many CCM stalwarts, the name Dira conjures up 
demons of the past. Clearly identified as an opposition mouthpiece, Dira is, above all, 
criticized for having deliberately sought to reopen the wounds of the past, instead of letting 
the departed rest in peace and allowing Zanzibari society to look forward rather than to the 
past. 
  
As was the case during the colonial period, today‘s Zanzibari intellectuals play a central role 
in the formulation and dissemination of concepts of identity, citizenship, and sovereignty 
(Glassman 2000, 2011). Learned individuals who have benefited from a certain quality of 
education and an environment favorable to critical reflection use the media to disseminate 
interpretations of the past that are aimed at contesting state nationalism. Taking advantage of 
the democratization of public discourse, and wishing to make their voices heard in the debates 
that have long been monopolized by members of the political parties, this critical 
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intelligentsia was a major forcein the resurgence of anonymous memories of the 1964 
Revolution and of theKarume period, and inthe articulation of these memories within the 
imaginaries of the nation in Zanzibar. 
 
The individual memories of the dark years of Zanzibar‘s history, undeniably linked to lived 
personal traumas, draw their references from the collective ideological discourses that 
articulate different conceptions of identity, citizenship, and sovereignty in Zanzibar. Far from 
being a spontaneous process, the surfacing of the traumatic past of the Isles and its growing 
diffusion through the public space are rendered possible by a new national historical 
configuration characterized by political freedomand an international context of claims to the 
right to memories of the past.The descendants of the victims of Zanzibar‘s authoritarian years 
constitute themselves as memory entrepreneurs by articulating fragments of memories 
transmitted by their parents, the available literature on the years 1964–1975, and their own 
interpretations of the contemporary political, social, and economic context of the Isles. 
Although recent attempts to introduce memories of the past in the public arena have 
temporarily been controlled by the state, there is every reason to believe that the international 
context of the reclaiming of memories has opened a breach for similar new initiatives to 
emerge and assert themselves. 
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i
 The period from 1964 to 1975 corresponds to the years of authoritarian rule under President 
Abeid Amani Karume, until his assassination in 1972, and the first years under President 
Aboud Jumbe, which are still characterized by repression. 
 
ii
 For detailed accounts of the Revolution and post-Revolution years, see the much-referred-to 
studies byLofchie (1963, 1965), Martin (1978), and Clayton (1981). 
 
iii
 Earlier pogroms of people of Arab origins took place in June 1961, after tense elections 
during which the competing political parties engaged ina politics of racial hatred(Burgess 
2010; Glassman 2011). 
 
iv
 The 1948 census indicates that 75.7 percent of the total population of Zanzibar were 
Africans (indigenous or from the Mainland), 16.9 percent Arabs, 6.1 percent Asians, 1.1 
percent Comorians, and 0.1 percent Europeans(Lofchie 1965: 71).Such identity referents were 
administrative categories which did not reflect identity positioning by groups and individuals. 
 
v
  The ―Committee of 14,‖ composed of the instigators and leaders of the Revolution, was 
thedecision-making cell of the revolutionary council, created on January 31, 1964. 
 
vi
 The Preventive Detention Decree of 1964 gave Karume powers to detain any person who 
was suspected ofputting the social order or the security of the state in danger(Shivji 2008: 60). 
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vii
 Among many essays exploring this issue, seeLofchie (1965), Clayton (1981), Babu (1991), 
Sheriff and Ferguson (1991), Shivji (2008), and Sheriff (2008). For sound studies of the main 
interpretations of the Revolution, see Myers (2000), Loimeier (2006) and Burgess (2010). 
 
viii
The original material presented in this article was collected during fieldwork carried out in 
2008 and 2009. Given that speaking openly of the massacres, arrests, and disappearances that 
occurred during the dark years still raises suspicions, I initially focused my ethnography on 
several accounts of disappearances during the post-revolutionary period that appeared in 2003 
in a now-banned weekly publication called Dira. Not only did I meet the former journalists of 
this polemical journal, but I also traced individuals who had engaged in a process of public 
evocation of their family histories in the pages of the newspaper. The journalists also 
introduced me to other witnesses, victims, or perpetrators of violence. As a result of the 
political sympathies of the former journalists of Dira, many of those with whom I spoke were 
supporters of, or members of, the opposition party, the Civil United Front. I also drew upon 
networks previously created not only with other actors from this period, but also with 
supporters or members of the party in power, the Chama Cha Mapinduzi. Finally, the present 
work is underpinned by informal relations, often of friendship, established over many months 
with different informants. 
 
ix
The authoritarian nature of power has declined significantly since democratization in 1992. 
In informal discussions among family and friends, people speak more easily of a past that was 
formerly the object of silence and secrecy. In public places, talk of the coup d'état and the 
post-revolutionary period has become commonplace. 
 
x
 Names that have been anonymized are marked by an asterisk (*).  
 
xi
 One day, the prisoner in charge of slops for the dozen prisoners inthe cell forgot the 
bucketin the prison courtyard. The prisoners asked the guard to bring it, or to let a prisoner go 
and fetch it, but he refused. Hussein* had no choice but to relieve himself in his plate. 
Thereafter, at each mealtime, the prisoners eyed their plates of cassava with disgust, each 
fearing that he had the soiled one. Hussein* was much amused by these fears, for he had, in 
fact, thrown the plate in question out of the cell‘ssingle small window. 
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xii
 Historians agree that the accusations against Kassim Hanga and Othman Shariff were a 
strategy to get rid ofKarume‘s two main political opponents (Prunier 1998: 110; Shivji 2008: 
113; Crozon 1992). 
 
xiii
 According to Shivji (2008: 114, footnote 39): ―Rumour has it that Twala fell out of favour 
with Karume because he resisted Karume‘s tendency to use funds from the state kitty. The 
lavish use of the state funds on the marriage festivities of Karume‘s first son was the last 
straw that broke the camel‘s back (sic).‖ 
 
xiv
Shivji (2008: 121, footnote 62) states that Nyerere was informed of the preparation of the 
assassination attempt on Karume, and that Nyerere would have supported, if not planned, the 
assassination attempt in order to put an end to Karume‘s authoritarian regime. In the course of 
the treason trial, Nyerere was called ―Mr. X.‖ 
 
xv
However, according toBakari (2001: 109, footnote 29), President Aboud Jumbe 
acknowledged for the first time in 1975, in an interview, that politicians who mysteriously 
disappeared under Karume were dead: ―They [Hanga, Othman Shariff, Twala, Muhammed 
Humud, Juma Maringo, Mdungi Ussi, Saleh Sadallah, Abdul Madhifu (sic)] have not 
vanished . . .  They have paid the price of the revolution. They are dead, yes.‖ 
